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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: USA Oil, an American
company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business
in California, has been conducting ongoing oil drilling operations in
the Gulf of Mexico. The company operates three oil platforms off the
Texas coast. One is located two miles offshore, another six miles
offshore, and the third ten miles offshore.
Federal authorities receive notice that on several occasions
since the company began operating these rigs, it deliberately allowed
large quantities of oil to leak into the Gulf from each of them. The
government seeks to indict USA Oil on three counts of violating the
Clean Water Act,1 as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.2 The
U.S. Attorney's office in the Southern District of Texas coordinates
the investigation as all relevant documents, witnesses, and evidence
are located in that district. All of USA Oil's executive officers reside
near the company's principal place of business in San Diego, in the
Southern District of California. The rig foreman in charge of USA
Oil's Gulf of Mexico operations at the time the violations occurred has
since left the company and now lives and works for another company
near Prudhoe Bay, in the District of Alaska.
Where should the government file the indictments? The
United States Constitution requires that the trial be held in the dis-
trict in which the crime was committed, 3 and the government must
1. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1994 ed.) ("Clean
Water Act") provides:
Any person who-
(A) knowingly violates... section 1321(b)(3) ... of this title.., shall be punished by a
fine of not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprison-
ment for not more than 3 years, or by both.
2. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, § 4301(c), Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 534, 537,
amended the criminal enforcement provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c), to
include violations of § 1321(b)(3). Section 1321(b)(3) provides:
The discharge of oil or hazardous substances (i) into or upon the navigable waters of the
United States... or... the contiguous zone, or (ii) in connection with activities under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act [43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq.] ... in such quantities
as may be harmful... is prohibited.
3. U.S. Const., Amend. VI.
[Vol. 49:825
OFFSHORE VENUE
prove that venue is proper by a preponderance of the evidence. 4
Failure to prove venue in a criminal trial precludes a conviction,5 and
if a verdict of acquittal results from that failure, such failure leads to
a double jeopardy bar to reindictment in the appropriate district.
6
Therefore, the government must make an airtight determination at
the outset of the prosecution as to where proper venue lies.
There are three separate venue provisions for the trial of fed-
eral crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3237 stipulates that venue for offenses begun
in one district and completed in another, or for offenses committed in
more than one district, lies in any of the districts in which the crime
occurred. However, it is the other two provisions which are relevant
to the problem of venue for crimes committed offshore but within the
territorial sea of the United States. Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 18 ("Rule 18") sets venue for crimes committed within a
single judicial district, while 18 U.S.C. § 3238 ("Section 3238") applies
to crimes committed outside of any judicial district. In the face of the
current ambiguity as to the limits between state and domestic federal
sovereignty in the marginal seas,7 there is presently no point at which
a definitive geographic line can be drawn dictating where Rule 18
ends and Section 3238 begins. Though in the past there have been
few federal criminal prosecutions of environmental crimes committed
in the territorial sea, several U.S. Attorney's Offices have become
more active in this area, and the Environmental Crimes Section of the
United States Department of Justice recently formed a Vessel and
International Pollution Unit specifically to address these crimes.
Thus, the frequency of prosecutions of this type will probably increase
in the near future, placing an even greater premium on the need for a
clear resolution of this issue.
This Note explores the question of venue for crimes committed
offshore but within the twelve-mile seaward limit of federal territorial
jurisdiction s for the purpose of determining where the seaward limit
4. United States v. Powell, 498 F.2d 890, 891 (9th Cir. 1974).
5. United States v. Gross, 276 F.2d 816, 818-19 (2d Cir. 1960).
6. See Part II.A and accompanying text for a discussion of the government's burden to
prove venue in a criminal case and the application of double jeopardy.
7. "Marginal seas" as used in this Note refers to the narrow band of ocean that surrounds
the nation. It does not, however, connote any particular defined breadth of sovereign territory
as does the term "territorial seas." That term is defined in the Third United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea as a twelve-nautical mile belt of sea around a coastal nation
over which that nation is sovereign with respect to all other nations. Third United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 3 (1982) CUNCLOS III").
8. It is well settled that the twelve-mile territorial sea proclaimed by President Reagan
in 1988 represents the seaward limit of national sovereignty. See generally Proclamation No.
5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988) ("Reagan Proclamation"); UNCLOS III, Art. 3.
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of the federal judicial district lies and thus where Rule 18 ends and
Section 3328 begins. Part II discusses Rule 18 and Section 3238 and
illustrates the importance of fixing the location of state boundaries in
order to make the proper choice between the two provisions. Because
there is no definite answer to the seaward extent of state territory,
the possibilities must be extracted from the historical development of
legal doctrines regarding offshore boundaries. Therefore, Part III
examines the history of the territorial sea and the development of
offshore federalism. Part IV discusses the various possible limits of
state territory and analyzes the implications of each in the context of
the USA Oil hypothetical. Part V proposes a new paradigm for
offshore criminal venue that unravels the web of uncertainty
currently plaguing the issue.
II. FEDERAL VENUE RULES
A. The Importance of Venue
More than merely formal legal procedure, proper venue in
criminal cases is a constitutional right of the defendant. Article III of
the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he Trial of all
Crimes... shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have
been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have
directed."9 Further, the Sixth Amendment guarantees that defen-
dants will receive a speedy trial "by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed."1 The consti-
tutional foundations of criminal venue place a burden on the govern-
ment to prove venue in every prosecution; such proof is an essential
part of the government's case without which there can be no convic-
tion."1 When the government obtains an indictment in an improper
venue, it has two choices:2 it can file a new indictment on the same
9. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
10. Id. Amend VI.
11. Gross, 276 F.2d at 818-19.
12. Because of the constitutional underpinnings of criminal venue, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure do not allow the government to move for change of venue in a criminal trial.
Only the defendant may make such a motion, under Rule 21(b), and even then only if it appears
that the offense was committed in more than one district and "if the court is satisfied that in the
interest of justice the proceeding should be transferred to another district or division in which
the commission of the offense is charged." United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 410 (1957).
[Vol. 49:825828
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charges in a different district where venue is proper, provided that
the statute of limitations has not expired, or it can try to obtain a
waiver of venue by the defendant. 13 If the government proceeds with
its case without proper venue, the defendant may make a timely ob-
jection at the close of the government's case which, if sustained, will
result in dismissal.14 Alternatively, the judge may dismiss the case
sua sponte for lack of venue. 15 If the case proceeds and the govern-
ment simply fails to prove venue at trial, a verdict of acquittal will
result. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 16 will
then prevent the government from obtaining a new indictment and
retrying the defendant in the proper district.7
B. Federal Venue Provisions: Rule 18 versus Section 3238
Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures provides
that venue for crimes committed within a single judicial district lies
in the district in which the crime was committed. This is the most
commonly implicated of the federal venue provisions and the easiest
for the government to prove. The government must simply show that
it is prosecuting the crime in the same district in which the defendant
committed it.
Section 3238 governs venue for crimes begun or committed on
the high seas or otherwise outside of any judicial district. It stipu-
lates:
The trial of all offenses begun or committed upon the high seas, or elsewhere
out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district
in which the offender, or any one of two or more joint offenders, is arrested or
is first brought; but if such offender or offenders are not so arrested or brought
into any district, an indictment or information may be filed in the district of
the last known residence of the offender or of any of two or more joint offend-
13. Because of the constitutional foundations of criminal venue, the standard for waiver is
high-it occurs only when the defendant fails to make any objection to venue during the trial
and in a very narrow set of additional circumstances. Gross, 276 F.2d at 819. See also Powell,
498 F.2d at 891 (stating that venue is waived when an objection is not made until after the jury
returns a guilty verdict); United States v. McMaster, 343 F.2d 176, 181 (6th Cir. 1965)
(identifying the same standard for waiver of venue).
14. Wayne R. LaFave and Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 25.3 at 1073 (West, 2d
ed. 1992).
15. Id.
16. The Fifth Amendment commands that "[n]o person shall.., be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const., Amend. V.
17. See generally LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure at 1073 (cited in note 14)
(discussing which dismissals are acquittals for purposes of double jeopardy).
18. Rule 18 codifies the directives of the Sixth Amendment. See note 10 and accompany-
ing text.
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ers, or if no such residence is known the indictment or information may be
filed in the District of Columbia. 19
There is substantial authority establishing that the two major
alternatives of Section 3238 are to be read in the disjunctive. 20 Thus,
the "last known residence" alternative applies if the indictment is
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1994 ed.). The meaning of the term "high seas" as used in Section
3238 is unclear. Under international law, "high seas" clearly denotes the area beyond the 200-
mile exclusive economic zone ("EEZ") of a coastal nation. UNCLOS III, Art. 86. The history of
the term in U.S. case law is less clear. Early cases variously refer to the high seas as the open
ocean which washes the seacoast or is not within the fauces terrae of any state, United States v.
Grush, 26 Fed. Cases 48, 51 (D. Mass. 1829), or as the open waters of the sea or ocean, as
distinguished from the ports, havens, and waters within the narrow headlands on the coast,
United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 254-55 (1893). More recently, federal courts have
defined the high seas as those waters lying seaward of the nation's territorial sea, and have
identified the territorial sea as the band of water that extends three miles from the coast. See,
for example, United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Romero-
Galue, 757 F.2d 1147, 1149 n.1 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1073
n.6 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397, 402 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1064-65 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978).
The definition of high seas given in these cases clearly is more expansive than the interna-
tional law definition. This discrepancy is necessary to preserve the integrity of the countless
domestic statutes which reference or rely upon the boundary between the territorial sea and the
high seas, including the Rule 18/Section 3238 statutory scheme. If the domestic definition of
high seas were to mirror the international definition, it would create a nearly 200-mile gap be-
tween the limits of the territorial sea and the EEZ which would be part of neither the territorial
sea nor the high seas, and within which the affected statutes technically would not apply. To
avoid this situation, it is reasonable to define the high seas as beginning, for domestic purposes,
at the limit of the territorial sea.
While providing a workable domestic definition for "high seas," the cases further refer to the
three-mile limit as the limit of the territorial sea. This would settle the question of venue for
crimes committed beyond three miles except for the fact that the U.S. territorial sea no longer
lies at three miles offshore. Since the Reagan Proclamation of 1988, see Part III.E, the U.S. has
claimed a twelve-mile territorial sea in accordance with UNCLOS III. The cases which
reference a three-mile territorial sea either pre-date this extension or draw their definitions
directly from an earlier case which pre-dates the extension. Furthermore, the discussion of the
meaning of the term high seas in these cases was dicta because the crimes alleged took place
beyond twelve miles. Therefore the question of whether the high seas begin at three or twelve
miles offshore was not at issue. Any court addressing the question today must consider the
effect of the Reagan Proclamation's declaration of a twelve-mile territorial sea.
20. See, for example, United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Hilger, 867 F.2d 566, 568 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Fraser, 709 F.2d
1556, 1558 (6th Cir. 1983).
Section 3238 offers two distinct alternatives for establishing venue. Fraser, 709 F.2d at
1556. The first alternative allows venue to be established for any offender, and any joint offend-
ers, in the district where one or more of the offenders was arrested or "first brought." The first
brought provision applies only where the offenders have been returned to the United States
already in custody. United States v. Catino, 735 F.2d 718, 724 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Provoo, 215 F.2d 531, 537 (2d Cir. 1954) (holding that a defendant who was not under restraint
when he returned to the U.S. was not "brought!' into the district where his ship came into port);
Hilger, 867 F.2d at 568 (citing Catino with approval for the proposition that "brought' means
"first brought into a jurisdiction while in custody"). The second alternative allows for the filing
of an indictment or information in the district of one of the offenders' last known addresses, or
in the District of Columbia if no such address is known.
OFFSHORE VENUE
filed before one of the offenders is arrested or first brought into any
district.2' When proceeding under this alternative, the indictment can
only be filed in the district of one of the defendants' last known resi-
dences.
22
The pivotal factor determining whether venue will be estab-
lished according to Rule 18 or Section 3238 is whether the crime oc-
curred within a judicial district or outside of all judicial districts. For
purposes of the USA Oil hypothetical, the relevant question is
whether each of the three individual oil platforms operated by USA
Oil is located within a single judicial district, in this case the
Southern District of Texas. If so, the government can proceed with
the prosecution in that district and will not have difficulty establish-
ing the venue.
However, if any or all of the offshore platforms lie outside of all
judicial districts, the government must rely on Section 3238 to estab-
lish venue for the charges relating to that particular facility. Because
none of the defendants are either present in Texas to be arrested
there or outside the country so that they can be "first brought" into
the Eastern District of Texas, venue will only be proper in the district
of one of the defendants' last known addresses (or if no address is
known, in the District of Columbia). Thus, since the defendants do
not reside in Texas, the government cannot prosecute them in that
district, despite the fact that it is the district nearest to the site of the
offenses and the one most affected by them, the district in which the
U.S. Attorney's office that investigated and prepared the case is
located, and probably the location of most of the witnesses and
evidence. The government must prosecute in the District of
Delaware, the Southern District of California, the District of Alaska,
or some other district where one of the corporate officer defendants
can be located.
In order to determine whether the platforms are located in any
federal district, it is necessary to refer to the federal definition of the
districts.23 The U.S. Code defines each district by reference to state
counties. For example,
21. Fraser, 709 F.2d at 1558.
22. Id. In Hilger, the Ninth Circuit held that where the defendant was not arrested or
first brought into any district, and the defendant's residence was known to be in a state other
than California, indictment of the defendant in the Northern District of California was im-
proper. 867 F.2d at 568.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 81 et seq. (1994 ed.).
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Florida is divided into three judicial districts to be known as the Northern,
Middle, and Southern Districts of Florida.
(c) The Southern District comprises the counties of Broward, Dade,
Highlands, Indian River, Martin, Monroe, Okeechobee, Palm Beach, and Saint
Lucie.
2 4
Hence, the district boundaries coincide with the boundaries of the
counties they contain. The county boundaries, in turn, are cotermi-
nous with those of their parent state.25 Therefore, the seaward limit
of the federal judicial districts, the point at which Rule 18 ends and
Section 3238 begins, depends upon the seaward limit of the state's
territory.
The obvious starting point for determining the seaward limits
of state territory is the coastal state's own definition of its boundaries.
Often, a state's boundary definitions appear in the state constitution.
For example, Florida's constitution defines the seaward extent of its
boundaries as follows:
[S]traight to the head of the St. Mary's river; then down the middle of said
river to the Atlantic ocean; thence southwestwardly along the coast to the edge
of the Gulf Stream; thence southeastwardly along the edge of the Gulf Stream
and Florida .Reefs to and including the Tortugas Islands; thence northeast-
wardly to a point three leagues from the mainland; thence northwestwardly
three leagues from the land to a point west of the mouth of the Perdido river;
thence to the place of beginning.
2 6
The California Constitution describes California's boundaries
as ... to the Pacific Ocean, and extending therein three English
miles .... ,27 Other states, such as Texas, rely on historical claims or
state statutes for the delineation of their seaward boundaries. 28 While
Congress generally approves a state's boundaries on its admission to
24. 28 U.S.C. § 89 (1994 ed.).
25. See, for example, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 7.13 (West, 1988):
The boundary lines of Dade County are as follows: Beginning at the southwest corner of
township fifty-one south, range thirty-five east;.. . thence east on the north boundary of
said section thirty-one and other sections to the waters of the Atlantic Ocean; thence
easterly to the eastern boundary of the State of Florida; thence southward along the
coast, including the waters of the Atlantic Ocean and the gulf stream within the juris-
diction of the State of Florida....
26. Fla. Const., Art. 1 (1868). A league, or marine league, is the equivalent of three nauti-
cal miles. Philip Babcock Gove, ed., Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged
1382 (Merriam-Webster, 1993).
27. Cal. Const., Art. XII, § 1 (1849).
28. See Marjorie M. Whiteman, 4 Digest of International Law § 3 at 764-68 (U.S. Dept. of
State, 1965), for an overview of the historical and statutory seaward boundary claims of several
of the coastal states.
[Vol. 49:825832
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the Union,29 it has never proclaimed a universal seaward limit for
state territory.
Congress's failure to establish a definite seaward limit for
state boundaries complicates the determination as to which venue
provision to apply because the federal districts cannot extend beyond
the seaward limits of the states. The states themselves have made
several boundary claims in the area from their coastlines out to the
twelve-mile limit of national sovereignty. 30 However, these claims are
based on several different types of control: title, jurisdiction, and
sovereignty.31 Only the last, sovereignty, satisfies the original intent
of Congress in drawing the federal districts: to make the districts co-
terminous with the plenary power of the states as defined by their
borders. But the physical boundaries of sovereignty are not always
coterminous with the boundaries of title and jurisdiction. Therefore,
any attempt to derive a uniform limit of state-and therefore federal
district-boundaries from these historical claims quickly becomes
bogged down in inconsistent and even illusory concepts.
This Note argues that the notion of state sovereignty upon
which the definition of the federal judicial districts ultimately relies is
just such an illusory concept. State sovereignty is nothing more than
a rhetorical construct with no certain meaning. It is therefore inap-
propriate for use in determining the seaward boundaries of the fed-
eral judicial district. This Note argues that the factor which should
determine the seaward limits of the federal judicial districts is the
limit of national sovereignty.
29. The usual device is a statehood act approving the new state's constitution, and by
implication, the boundary description contained in that constitution. John Briscoe, The Effect of
President Reagan's 12.Mile Territorial Sea Proclamation on the Boundaries and Extraterritorial
Powers of the Coastal States, 2 Terr. Sea J. 225, 228 & n.7 (1992). See, for example, Act for the
Admission of California into the Union, ch. 50, 9 Stat. 452 (1850). Of the original eleven coastal
states, none expressly claimed a three-mile boundary until after the formation of the Union.
Briscoe, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 228 n.6. See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 21 n.22 (1960).
30. See note 8 for an explanation of the twelve-mile territorial sea as the limit of national
sovereignty.
31. The distinction between jurisdiction and sovereignty is overlooked in most discussions
of offshore federalism, but is crucial to this discussion. Jurisdiction refers to the authority pos-
sessed by the government to regulate specific types of conduct in a particular area. See Black's
Law Dictionary 853 (West, 6th ed. 1990). Sovereignty, on the other hand, is a far weightier con-
cept, denoting the "supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent
state is governed; ... [the] paramount control of the constitution and ... the self sufficient
source of political power." Id. at 1396. A nation is sovereign over its territorial sea in the same
way that it is sovereign over land. By contrast, a nation has jurisdiction in its contiguous zone
(the belt of the marginal seas from 12 to 24 miles from the nation's coast) over customs, immi-
gration, fiscal, and sanitary issues, though the nation lacks sovereignty in this area. Douglas
W. Kmiec, Legal Issues Raised by the Proposed Presidential Proclamation to Extend the
Territorial Seas, 1 Terr. Sea J. 1, 3-4 (1990). See UNCLOS III, Art. 33.
1996] 833
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The first step in this process is an examination of the develop-
ment of offshore federalism and the history of the territorial sea, the
ultimate limit of national sovereignty. What historical acts and ac-
tions influenced the development of the territorial sea, and what ef-
fects did these have on the location of state boundaries vis-A-vis na-
tional sovereignty? The next step requires a determination of where
the limit of state territory in the marginal seas is currently located,
and what other possibilities exist that may be equally valid and per-
haps more appropriate. Then, having considered all of the possible
limits, we can apply each of these claims to the hypothetical case to
evaluate their strengths and weaknesses as possible boundaries for
the federal districts. Although this Note argues that we should aban-
don any reliance on the historical development of offshore federalism
in ascertaining the limits of the federal judicial districts, the current
state of the law requires such reliance. As a practical matter, attor-
neys faced with questions of venue for alleged crimes committed
within twelve miles of shore must make arguments based on the law
as it currently stands. This requires tracing the choice of the appro-
priate venue statute from the federal district definitions, to the ap-
propriate state's county boundaries, to the boundaries of the state
itself. It is only through consideration of the history and development
of the territorial sea and offshore federalism that state boundaries
can be determined.
With this purpose in mind, the following section examines that
history and development in order to sort out the conflicting claims of
state title, jurisdiction, and sovereignty within twelve miles of the
coast. It is essential to understand the legal and historical founda-
tions of the competing state and federal claims in order to assess their
validity. In addition, a broad understanding of this developmental
process is valuable for what it reveals about the nature of the claims
themselves. There is no more compelling argument for the revision
and clarification of federal district boundaries called for in this Note
than the complete lack of relationship between the developmental
process and the issue of venue for offshore crimes.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
OFFSHORE FEDERALISM
According to international law, "[t]he sovereignty of a coastal
[nation] extends beyond its land territory and internal waters.., over
[Vol. 49:825834
OFFSHORE VENUE
an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea."32 This sover-
eignty extends from the seabed and underlying subsoil to the surface
and the airspace above it. 3 The Third United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS III") sets a limit of twelve nautical
miles 34 as the maximum breadth any nation may claim for its
territorial sea. From virtually the inception of the Union until 1988,
the United States adhered to a claim of three miles for its territorial
sea. Until the Tidelands Controversy of the 1930s, it was generally
presumed that the states were sovereign to this three-mile limit;
however, the Tidelands Controversy abrogated that notion, and
despite the ultimate failure of the federal government's attempt to
claim exclusive sovereignty over that area, the question of the extent,
or even the existence, of state sovereignty in the marginal seas
became clouded with uncertainty.35  With the passage of the
Submerged Lands Act in 1953, Congress transferred title to the
submerged lands within three miles of the coast to the states, but the
question of the seaward extent of state sovereignty persisted, now
largely unnoticed in the face of the newfound certainty as to title and
jurisdiction. Provisions of the Submerged Lands Act allowing Gulf
Coast states to retain nine-mile boundaries with proof of an historical
claim of that extent 36 further complicated this question by allowing
some states to assert boundaries beyond the limits of national
sovereignty. Finally, in 1988 President Reagan issued a proclamation
declaring a twelve-mile territorial sea, but including a disclaimer of
questionable effect stating that the extension applied for international
purposes only.37
This patchwork of federal and state claims and grants created
a glaring lack of certainty regarding the present limits of state terri-
tory in the marginal seas. Because accurate venue determinations
32. UNCLOS III, Art. 2(1).
33. Id. at Art. 2(2).
34. The territorial sea is measured in nautical miles as opposed to statute miles. A stat-
ute mile, the measure generally used on land, derives from the Latin for 1000 paces and equals
5,280 feet. By contrast, a nautical mile equals one degree of latitude on the Earth's surface, the
equivalent of 6,076 feet, or 1.15 statute miles. Robert Jay Wilder, The Three-Mile Territorial
Sea: Its Origins and Implications for Contemporary Offshore Federalism, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. 681,,
681 n.1 (1992). This difference is crucial for the physical delimitation of coastal state bounda-
ries but is not essential for purposes of this discussion, and the generic term "miles" will be used
throughout this Note.
35. The Tidelands Controversy is discussed in Part III.C.
36. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(b), 1302 (1988 ed.).
37. Reagan Proclamation, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (cited in note 8). The disclaimer stated:
"Nothing in this Proclamation: (a) extends or otherwise alters existing Federal or State law or
any jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived therefrom...."
1996] 835
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depend upon the seaward boundaries of the districts, which in turn
depend upon the seaward limits of the coastal states, establishment of
a clear and consistent limit to state territory in the marginal seas is
crucial.
A. The Origins of National Sovereignty in the Marginal Seas
The twenty-three coastal states existing today consist of three
historical categories. Eleven of the original thirteen colonies were
coastal states. These states were independent, sovereign jurisdictions
before coming together to form the Union.38 Two other coastal states,
Texas and Hawaii, also existed as sovereign republics before joining
the Union.39 The remaining ten coastal states were created out of
territory held by the U.S. prior to their admission to the Union. 40
Upon forming the Union, the original thirteen states did not
give up all aspects of sovereignty. They retained all the rights and
powers which they did not expressly or by implication surrender to
the federal government, and the federal government had no powers
other than those granted by the states in the Constitution.41 This
holds true in the marginal seas as well as on land. However, the
Supreme Court has since made it clear that the original coastal states
were never sovereign beyond their shores. 42 Thus, the powers the fed-
eral government originally gained in the marginal seas were of a far
more limited scope than those it gained on land.
All states that subsequently joined the Union enjoy the same
elements of sovereignty as the original thirteen by virtue of the "equal
footing" doctrine set forth in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan.43 In Pollard's
Lessee, the Supreme Court held that Alabama gained admission to the
Union, "on an equal footing" with the original states, inheriting the
full degree of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain enjoyed
by its parent state, Georgia. Therefore, the Court held that Alabama
was sovereign over the navigable waters and the lands beneath them,
38. Gordon Ireland, Marginal Seas Around the States, 2 La. L. Rev. 252, 270-71 (1940).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 271.
41. Id. at 272. These powers included the power to collect duties, provide for the national
defense, regulate foreign and interstate commerce, punish felonies on the high seas and offenses
against the law of nations, and maintain military installations. Id. See U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8.
42. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 31-32 (1947). In California, the Court con-
cluded that the nation did not become sovereign over the three-mile belt until 1793 when the
United States first asserted such a claim against foreign nations. Id. at 33. See notes 88-103
and accompanying text for a discussion of California, and Part III.B for a discussion of the
United States' initial claim over the three-mile belt.
43. 44 U.S. (3 Howard) 212, 223 (1845).
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subject to the rights possessed by the United States that had been
surrendered by the original states under the U.S. Constitution."4 In
Shiveley v. Bowlby,45 the Court further explained that the equal foot-
ing doctrine guarantees that "new States admitted into the Union
since the adoption of the Constitution have the same rights as the
original States in the tide waters, and in the lands below the high
water mark within their respective jurisdictions. 46  Thus, riparian
owners' title and rights in the lands beneath the high water mark of
navigable waters are covered by the laws of the state, subject to the
powers granted to the federal government by the Constitution.47 The
Court considered this to be "inherent in her character as a sovereign,
independent State, or indispensable to her equality with her sister
States.""
It is clear that at the inception of the Union, neither the states
nor the nation were sovereign in the marginal seas. More impor-
tantly, this did not change even as the federal government obtained
exclusively federal territory through its westward expansion and an-
nexed that territory as new states. It is important to keep this in
mind when weighing the validity of the various possible limits of state
sovereignty in the marginal seas. The current state of the law sug-
gests that the sovereignty of the federal government now not only en-
compasses but surpasses that of the several states in the marginal
seas. If that is the case, it is not due to any inherent and exclusive
federal rights in the marginal seas resulting from the territorial
means by which the nation grew. Instead, this situation can be traced
to the Tidelands Controversy of the middle part of this century. The
history of that controversy reveals much about the seaward extent of
state sovereignty past and present. It further provides an appropriate
44. Id. at 228-29. In California, the Court limited the direct application of Pollard's Lessee
to internal waters. 332 U.S. at 36-38. "Internal waters" are those that lie landward of the
baseline used to measure the territorial sea. UNCLOS III, Art. 8(1). The term includes rivers,
harbors, small bays, and other bodies of water which may be enclosed by a straight baseline in
accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS III. Id. Art. 7. A nation is sovereign over its
internal waters in exactly the same way that it is sovereign over the land within its borders.
See UNCLOS III, Art. 2(1). In contrast to the territorial sea, over which a nation is also
sovereign, there is no right of innocent passage by ships of foreign nations through any nation's
internal waters. See id. Art. 17. Because the original states were never sovereign in the
marginal seas, there was no need to grant such status to newer states. But as explained in note
129, the Court employed a converse application of the equal footing doctrine in United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950), making it a vital concept in the development of offshore federalism.
45. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
46. Id. at 26.
47. Id. at 40.
48. Id. at 34. See Donna R. Christie, State Historic Interests in the Marginal Seas, 2 Terr.
Sea J. 151, 152 & n.46 (1992), for a more complete discussion of the equal footing doctrine.
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starting point for a discussion of the validity and appropriateness of
the various possible limits of state sovereignty and the practical effect
of each of those limits on current venue determinations for crimes
committed within the marginal seas.
B. The United States and the Cannon Shot Rule
The one hundred fifty-year-old notion of state sovereignty over
a three-mile belt of the marginal seas that predominated in this
country until the Tidelands Controversy of the late 1930s and early
1940s is traceable to a letter that then-Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson sent to the governments of France and Great Britain on
November 8, 1793. 49 In the letter, Jefferson asserted that there was a
zone of neutrality surrounding the United States into which neither of
the warring nations should intrude.50 Jefferson defined the breadth of
this zone as the range of a cannon ball, generally one sea league.51
The basis of the claim announced in Jefferson's letter was the cannon
shot rule.52 This rule originated in 1610 and gained widespread
acceptance in 1702 with the writings of Cornelius van Bynkershoek.
53
Essentially, the rule holds that a nation exercises sovereignty over its
marginal seas for as far seaward as its cannons can shoot.54
The cannon shot rule predominated from 1702 to 1793, during
which time the effective cannon range remained relatively constant at
three miles, and remained viable until 1911.55 Thus, Jefferson, under
pressure from President Washington to make an initial claim, relied
upon the cannon shot principle. 56 However, neither Jefferson nor
49. David L. Larson, National Security Aspects of the United States Extension of the
Territorial Sea to Twelve Nautical Miles, 2 Terr. Sea J. 189, 193 (1992).
50. In 1793, France, Great Britain, and Spain, all of which held territory in North
America, were engaged in maritime conflicts off the Atlantic coast of the United States in an
extension of hostilities occurring between the nations in Europe. Kmiec, 1 Terr. Sea J. at 9
(cited in note 31).
51. A sea league is identical to a marine league, and is the equivalent of three nautical
miles. Gove, ed., Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Abridged at 2047 (cited in note
26).
52. Larson, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 193 (cited in note 49) (citing Philip C. Jessup, The Law of
Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction 6 (G. A. Jennings, 1927).
53. Wherefore on the whole it seems a better rule that the control of the land [over the
sea] extends as far as cannon will carry... that the control from the land ends where
the power of men's weapons ends ... ; for it is this, as we have said, that guarantees
possession.
Id. at 191 (quoting Cornelius van Bynkershoek, De Dorninio Mars Dissertatio 44, 364 (1923)).
54. Sayre A. Swarztrouber, The Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas 24 (Naval Inst.,
1972).
55. Id. at 25.
56. Kmiec, 1 Terr. Sea J. at 9 (cited in note 31).
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Washington wished to be hurried into a final decision as to United
States control over the marginal seas.5 7 Therefore, the claim made in
Jefferson's letter was merely provisional. It explicitly reserved the
right of the Executive to claim a greater distance in the future.58 The
issue subsided, however, for nearly one hundred fifty years. No
further territorial sea expansion of the sort contemplated by
Washington and Jefferson was made for nearly two centuries, until
President Reagan proclaimed a twelve-mile U.S. territorial sea in
1988.19
C. The Tidelands Controversy
The series of events that broke the silence and ultimatly pro-
voked the present uncertainty as to the seaward location of state
boundaries has come to be known as the Tidelands Controversy.
Until the Tidelands Controversy, the general presumption was that
states were sovereign offshore for three miles. 60 This presumption
rested on a belief that the original states possessed sovereignty over
the three-mile belt upon joining the Union61 and was buttressed by
Thomas Jefferson's assertion of territorial rights over that area in
1793.62 The Tidelands Controversy abrogated this notion, obscuring
the extent and even the existence of state sovereignty.
The Tidelands Controversy had its roots in the early 1930s
with speculators who wanted the federal government to issue them
permits for drilling in the submerged lands beneath the marginal
seas.63 Since 1842, when the Supreme Court decided Martin et al. v.
Waddell,64 it had been settled law that the coastal states "owned" the
submerged lands within their internal waters and bays and alone had
the power to grant such permits.65 The speculators wanted the
federal government to assert federal ownership over the submerged
57. Id.
58. Id. at 10.
59. For a comprehensive history of the cannon shot rule and the development of the terri.
torial sea from Roman Law to the present, see Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. 681 (cited in note 34);
Swarztrauber, The Three-Mile Limit of Territorial Seas (cited in note 54); Larson, 2 Terr. Sea J.
at 191-98 (cited in note 49).
60. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 710-11 (cited in note 34).
61. This belief was explicitly refuted by the Supreme Court in California, 332 U.S. at 36-
38. See notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
62. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 711 (cited in note 34).
63. Id.
64. 41 U.S. (16 Peters) 367 (1842).
65. Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 151-52 (cited in note 48).
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lands66 so that it could issue to the speculators the permits currently
controlled by the states. 67 Oil companies drilling and planning to drill
in the Gulf of Mexico and off the coast of California would then be
forced to buy the permits from the speculators at exorbitant rates.
Federal officials routinely rejected the requests of these
"claimjumpers," but in 1934 one of the speculators, a personal friend
of President Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, per-
suaded the Secretary to reconsider the issue.68 Roosevelt officials
sought to adopt strong federal policies in order to combat the Great
Depression, and Secretary Ickes was especially bold about broadening
the powers of the Department of the Interior.69 The President himself
strongly favored a significant expansion of U.S. territorial jurisdic-
tion, at one point even exploring the feasibility of establishing naval
oil reserves, beginning at the shoreline and extending out to halfway
across the ocean.70 On June 9, 1937, Secretary Ickes ordered the
Department of the Interior to cease the routine rejection of the
speculators' permit requests and place them in abeyance. 7' This
66. In Martin, the Court settled a dispute over the ownership of submerged land off the
coast of New Jersey by articulating the basic principles which were to govern ownership of sub.
merged lands for the next hundred years: "when the Revolution took place, the people of each
state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their
navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights
since surrendered by the Constitution to the general Government." 41 U.S. at 410. Martin
dealt only with internal waters, but the Court used the term "navigable waters" in its holding,
which includes the territorial sea. For this reason, the case was commonly interpreted as
applying to the submerged lands of the continental shelf as well. Interview with Michael W.
Reed, United States Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division,
General Litigation Section (Feb. 20, 1996) ("Reed Interview"). The equal footing doctrine
announced in Pollard's Lessee and reiterated in Shively established that these principles applied
not only to the thirteen original states but to all states subsequently admitted to the Union. See
notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
67. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 711-12 (cited in note 34).
68. Id. at 711-15.
69. Id. Wilder suggests that another factor in Ickes's willingness to reconsider this long.
settled issue may have been a concern that once he began looking into the matter, principles of
laches and estoppel would require the government to assert whatever claims of dormant rights
it may have had in order to preserve them. Id. at 714.
70. Id. at 718. Another factor contributing to the President's eagerness to extend U.S.
territorial jurisdiction was the growing conflict with the Japanese over Alaskan salmon fisher-
ies, particularly in Bristol Bay, Alaska. The U.S. was concerned about depletion of the salmon
stock through overfishing, but Japan refused to negotiate any agreement that would limit
Japanese fishing activity in the waters off Alaska. Id. at 721-23.
71. Id. at 714. Secretary Ickes's reversal in position was particularly significant in light of
his response to one lease applicant in 1933. In the now-famous Proctor Letter, Ickes wrote that
"[tlitle to the soil under the ocean within the 3-mile limit is in the State of California, and the
land may not be appropriated except by authority of the State." Letter from Harold L. Ickes,
Secretary of the Interior, to Olin S. Proctor (Dec. 22, 1933) 'Proctor Letter"), cited in Christie, 2
Terr. Sea J. at 153 (cited in note 48). In the letter, Secretary Ickes cited Hardin v. Jordan, 140
U.S. 371, 381 (1891), in which the Supreme Court stated:
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action immediately clouded the rights of states and lessees in the
submerged lands and dampened economic development of the
Continental Shelf.72  After a failed attempt to obtain a legislative
appropriation of submerged lands within three miles of the coast,
73
Secretary Ickes altered his strategy and attempted to obtain title to
the submerged lands for the federal government in court.74
Secretary Ickes wanted a test case brought against the state of
California, but Attorney General Francis Biddle convinced President
Roosevelt that with the advent of World War II it was not an appro-
priate time to inflame the nation's oil-producing states. 75 Biddle also
expressed grave doubts, shared by Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
about the constitutional authority of the President to extend U.S. ju-
risdiction beyond territorial waters and about the advisability of doing
so with respect to international law and foreign relations.76
To strengthen his position, Secretary Ickes allied with the
Navy and the Department of Defense, citing national defense and the
Navy's ostensible need for a Naval Petroleum Reserve off the coast of
California.7 7 Despite the questionable need for such a reserve and the
Navy's exceptionally poor record of managing its inland reserves, 78 the
interest of the Navy strengthened the government's case. 79 With the
replacement of Secretary of State Hull on the interdepartmental
negotiating team,80 the Departments of Interior and State reached a
compromise and sent a memo to President Roosevelt recommending
that he issue two separate proclamations: one asserting jurisdiction
over the resources of the continental shelf and another asserting
jurisdiction over coastal fisheries.81 While the memo recommended
With regard to grants of the government for lands bordering on tide water, it has been
distinctly settled that they only extend to high-water mark, and that the title to the
shore and lands under water in front of lands so granted enures to the State within
which they are situated.... Such title to the share and lands under water is regarded
as incidental to the sovereignty of the state... and cannot be retained or granted out to
individuals by the United States.
Proctor Letter (quoted in Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 153 n.11 (cited in note 48)).
72. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 714 (cited in note 34).
73. Id. at 715-17.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 729.
76. Id. at 718-19. President Roosevelt's enthusiasm for expanding U.S. jurisdiction off-
shore led him to merge in his own mind the domestic issue of federal versus state sovereignty
with the international issue of extending national jurisdiction. Id. at 718.
77. Id. at 717.
78. Id.
79. Id.




that the President stop short of asserting a single extended regime,8 2
the compromise between Interior and State predictably failed to
consider the states' interests in these new zones. 83
President Roosevelt approved the memo two weeks before his
death, leaving it to President Truman to issue what would become
known as the Truman Proclamations. 4 The proclamations did not
purport to resolve the questions of domestic federalism and sover-
eignty within three miles of the coast,8 5 but they effectively precluded
states from making their own extended jurisdictional claims in the
marginal sea.8 6 Thus, after the proclamations, the area beyond three
miles was considered to be exclusively federal. This casually con-
ceived notion would shape the development of offshore federalism
over the ensuing decades, and continues to do so today.
87
After issuing the proclamations in 1945, President Truman,
with considerable prompting from Secretary Ickes, ordered Attorney
General Tom Clark to file an original action in the Supreme Court
against the State of California.88 Secretary Ickes sought to have the
U.S. declared the owner in fee simple, with the accompanying rights
and powers, of the submerged lands within three miles of the low
water line of the coast of California. 9 Both sides contended that they
possessed title to these lands. California argued that because the
original colonies acquired all lands beneath navigable waters within
the marginal sea from England, California also had vested ownership
of these lands under the equal footing doctrine.9 0 However, the Court
found insufficient evidence to establish that England ever claimed
title that could have passed to the colonies.91 It also limited the appli-
cation of Pollard's Lessee to internal waters. 92 The Court concluded
that acquisition of the three-mile belt was first accomplished by the
82. Id. at 730.31.
83. Id. at 730.
84. Id. at 730-31.
85. Id. at 731. Attorney General Biddle's opposition to the filing of a test case and his ad-
monitions about inflaming the oil-producing states convinced President Roosevelt to drop the
domestic issue of federal versus state sovereignty. In response, Secretary Ickes turned his at-
tention from gaining department of justice support and sought an accord with the State
Department alone. Id. at 729.
86. Id. at 731.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 732. See California, 332 U.S. at 22-23.
89. Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 156 (cited in note 48).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 156-57.
92. Id. at 157. See California, 332 U.S. at 36-38.
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federal government through Thomas Jefferson's 1793 letter to the
governments of France and Great Britain.93
The Court viewed the federal government as more than a mere
property owner. It observed that the federal government, as the en-
tity responsible for the conduct of foreign relations, has a duty to pro-
tect and defend the marginal seas.94 This observation foreshadowed
the Court's holding that the ocean, including the three-mile belt, is
vitally important to international peacekeeping and world com-
merce, 95 the paramount responsibilities of the federal government.9 6
The Court stated that our constitutional system does not equip the
states with the powers necessary to uphold "the responsibilities which
would be concomitant with the dominion which it seeks."97
Importantly, the Court did not think that these interests ne-
cessitated federal ownership of the territorial sea. Rather, the Court
held only "that California is not the owner of the three-mile marginal
belt along its coast, and that the Federal Government rather than the
state has paramount rights in and power over that belt, an incident to
which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water
area, including oil."98
Justice Frankfurter's dissent pointed out some rather serious
flaws in the Court's reasoning. "Of course the United States has
'paramount rights' in the sea belt of California-the rights that are
implied by the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the
power of condemnation, the treaty-making power, the war power."99
He pointed out that no interference with these rights was before the
Court, only questions of ownership. Oil's importance to national secu-
rity is irrelevant to the issue of ownership or dominion. 100
Echoing Justice Frankfurter's criticism, Congress reacted
strongly to the Court's opinion. The Senate Judiciary Committee
heard testimony describing the case as 'creating an estate never be-
fore heard of,' 'a reversal of what all competent people believed the
law to be,'... 'a threat to our constitutional system of dual sover-
93. Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 157 (cited in note 48). See Part III.B.
94. Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 157 (cited in note 48).
95. Id. See California, 332 U.S. at 35.
96. California, 332 U.S. at 35.
97. Id. at 35-36.
98. Id. at 38-39 (emphasis added). See Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 157-58 (cited in note 48).
99. California, 332 U.S. at 44 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at
158 (cited in note 48).
100. California, 332 U.S. at 44-45 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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eignty,'... [and] 'causing pandemonium.' "101 The Committee Report
concluded that the decision set out the law differently from what
members of the legal community thought it to be, and also differently
from what the Supreme Court had apparently believed it to be.102
The Court's holding, however controversial, that the federal
government had paramount rights in submerged lands, but not title
to them, did not give the federal government the necessary statutory
authority to lease submerged lands within the three-mile limit. Yet
the decision created grave doubts as to the security of existing leases
from the State of California and the appropriate source of new
leases.103
Congress responded by considering a number of bills to quit-
claim the submerged lands within three miles to the states. 10 4 The
federal government, meanwhile, won two more original actions
against Louisiana and Texas, clarifying rights but not title in the
submerged lands in favor of the federal government.0 5 However, the
Executive still had to submit to Congress for the statutory authority
to issue permits, and Congress still refused to provide it.106 President
Truman responded in kind by vetoing the only quitclaim bill to come
before him.107
D. The Submerged Lands Act and the Submerged Lands Cases
The stalemate between the executive and legislative branches
lasted until 1952, when President Eisenhower took office. Several
new quitclaim bills were introduced immediately in Congress"0 8 and in
1953 Eisenhower signed the Submerged Lands Act ("SIA"), °9 quit-
claiming all federal proprietary rights in the submerged lands within
three miles of shore, or up to nine miles in the Gulf of Mexico, to the
101. Confirming and Establishing the Titles of the States to Lands and Resources in and
Beneath Navigable Waters Within State Boundaries and to Provide for the Use and Control of
Said Lands and Resources, Senate Rep. No. 1592, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (June 10, 1948).
102. Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 160 (cited in note 48).
103. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 733 n.329 (cited in note 34).
104. Id. at 734.
105. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); Texas, 339 U.S. at 707 (1950).
106. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 734 (cited in note 34).
107. Id. at 736.
108. Out of concern that President Eisenhower would only be willing to sign a three-mile
quitclaim bill similar to the one President Truman vetoed, most of the bills took a conservative
approach and failed to consider any progressive approaches involving shared federal-state ad-
ministration of a broader area offshore. Id. at 737. This proved to be an opportunity unneces-
sarily foregone, for Eisenhower was strongly in favor of "returning' the submerged lands to the
states. Id.
109. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1988 ed.).
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coastal states.'10 Shortly thereafter, he also signed its companion, the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,' confirming rights in the seabed
and subsoil beyond three miles to the federal government.
112
With the SLA, Congress accomplished several goals. It establ-
ished and confirmed the states' title to and ownership of submerged
lands and resources within three miles, or up to nine miles in the Gulf
of Mexico, as well as the power to manage, administer, lease, develop,
and use those lands and resources. 113 It further relinquished to the
states "all right, title, and interest of the United States, if any it has,
in and to all said lands, improvements, and natural resources.""4 In
so doing, Congress explicitly resolved all uncertainty regarding
offshore leases that had resulted from the Tidelands Controversy and
the California decision."5
The final major effect of the SLA was to establish definite state
boundaries. The Act approved and confirmed the three-mile limit as
the seaward boundary of the coastal states, allowing a greater bound-
ary of up to nine miles only in the Gulf of Mexico, and only if the state
could prove a legitimate prior claim of greater than three miles.116
The provision for the extension of state boundaries in the Gulf of
Mexico was for the benefit of Florida and Texas, both of which had
historical claims to a three-league boundary in the Gulf."17 Florida's
claim was based on its constitution, which Congress approved in
1868,118 and which defined Florida's boundaries as extending "to a
110. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 738 (cited in note 34).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (1988 ed. & Supp. V).
112. Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 161 (cited in note 48).
113. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988 ed.).
114. Id. § 1311(b).
115. See id. § 1311(c).
116. Section 4 stated:
The seaward boundary of each original coastal State is approved and confirmed as a line
three geographical miles distant from its coast line.... Nothing in this section is to be
construed as questioning or in any manner prejudicing the existence of any State's sea-
ward boundary beyond three geographical miles if it was so provided by its constitution
or laws prior to or at the time such State became a member of the Union, or if it has
been heretofore approved by Congress.
Id. § 1312. Section 1 defined the term "boundaries" to include:
... the seaward boundaries of a State or its boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico... as they
existed at the time such State became a member of the Union .... but in no event shall
the term "boundaries" or the term 'lands beneath navigable waters" be interpreted as
extending from the coast line more than three geographical miles into the Atlantic
Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, or more than three marine leagues into the Gulf of
Mexico ....
Id. § 1301(b).
117. Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 163-64 (cited in note 48).
118. Id. at 164.
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point three leagues from the mainland" in the Gulf of Mexico.119
Texas's claim relied on the three league boundary it claimed as an
independent nation prior to its annexation in 1845.120 The federal
government soon challenged both of these claims, as well as similar
claims made by Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. In United
States v. Louisiana (Louisiana 1-),121 the Supreme Court upheld
Texas's claim and denied the claims of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama. 12  The Court also upheld Florida's claim in a separate
opinion issued concurrently with the first, United States v. Florida.1
23
In the last of the submerged lands cases bearing upon this
issue, United States v. Maine,124 the federal government brought an
original action against the thirteen Atlantic coastal states, which
were claiming exclusive rights in the resources of the submerged
lands beyond three miles of their coastlines and beyond their three-
mile SLA boundaries. 125 The states' claims rested on what they ar-
gued was a succession to the rights of the British crown, either
through their charters or at independence.126 The federal government,
asserting its own exclusive rights in the natural resources of the sub-
merged lands seaward of the three-mile state boundaries established
in the SLA,127 argued that the issue of historical succession had been
resolved by the California, Texas, and Louisiana decisions.128
The Supreme Court accepted the conclusions of the special
master and reaffirmed its holdings in California, Texas, and
Louisiana.129 The Court viewed those cases as resting on a dual basis
119. Fla. Const., Art. I.
120. Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 164 n.77 (cited in note 48).
121. 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
122. Id. at 83-84.
123. 363 U.S. 121, 129 (1960).
124. 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
125. Id. at 516-17. The action originally included the State of Florida, but the action
against Florida was later severed when it became apparent that Florida's claims, which were
based solely on its constitution, which defined the state's boundaries as extending "to the edge of
the Gulf Stream," Fla. Const., Art. I, had nothing in common with the claims of the other
Atlantic states. Maine, 420 U.S. at 517 n.3. Florida's claims were tried separately. Id. See
Michael W. Reed, G. Thomas Koester, and John Briscoe, eds., The Reports of the Special Masters
of the United States Supreme Court in the Submerged Lands Cases, 1949-1987 at 591
(Landmark Publishing, 1991) ('Special Masters'Reports").
126. Special Masters'Reports at 591 (cited in note 125).
127. Milner S. Ball, The Law of the Sea: Federal-State Relations and the Extension of the
Territorial Sea, Prolegomena to an Experimental Politics (U. of Ga., 1978).
128. Special Masters' Reports at 591 (cited in note 125).
129. The Court appointed a Special Master to hear and evaluate the evidence and submit
recommendations to the Court. Id. The Special Master noted that the Court previously consid-
ered the question of whether the colonies entered the Union with sovereign rights in the sub-
merged lands beyond their coasts, and determined that they had not. Id. By virtue of the equal
846 [Vol. 49:825
1996] OFFSHORE VENUE 847
of history and pure legal principle.130 It held that as a matter of law,
the Constitution granted the federal government jurisdiction over
foreign commerce, foreign affairs, and national defense.' 3, As a
matter of law, paramount rights for the federal government in the
marginal seas are an attribute of those external sovereign powers. 132
Maine, while confirming the Court's previous holdings that
none of the coastal states have been sovereign beyond their shorelines
at least since the formation of the Union, did not reduce the rights
these states received from the federal government under the SLA.
Despite their lack of sovereignty and the paramount rights of the
federal government, the coastal states were entitled to anything the
federal government deemed appropriate to give them. 3 3 With the
SLA, the federal government granted them exclusive title to and
rights in the land from their coastlines to three miles offshore, and
those rights and title remained valid even after Maine."3
E. The Reagan Proclamation
The next major development in offshore federalism occurred in
1988. Following the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, which adjourned in 1982, coastal nations around the world
expanded their territorial sea claims to the newly approved distance
of twelve miles.'13 Although the Convention had not been ratified by
the requisite sixty nations, and although the United States itself was
footing doctrine, the Court had held that California, Texas, and Louisiana also entered the
Union without sovereign rights over this area. Id. The Special Master concluded that the
Court's holdings in these cases applied with equal force to the Atlantic States. Id.
The decision in Texas differed from the California and Louisiana decisions in one very
important respect. Texas had been an independent sovereign republic prior to its annexation
and had therefore held sovereign rights over the submerged lands out to its three-league bound-
ary in the Gulf. Texas, 339 U.S. at 711. Texas argued that that territory had never been trans-
ferred to the United States and that it therefore retained its sovereignty over the area. Id. The
Court rejected Texas's arguments, applying instead a "converse" application of the equal footing
doctrine. The Court stated that equal footing "negatives any implied, special limitation of any of
the paramount powers of the United States in favor of a State." Id. at 717. Becoming a sister
state of the Union on equal footing with the rest of the states "entailed a relinquishment of some
of [Texas's] sovereignty," id. at 718, and resulted in a holding similar to that of the other two
cases. See Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 159 (cited in note 48) (discussing the Coures use of the
equal footing doctrine in Texas).
130. Maine, 420 U.S. at 522.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 522-23. See Report of Albert B. Maris, Special Master (Aug. 27, 1974) (reprinted
in Special Masters'Reports (cited in note 125)). See also Ball, The Law of the Sea at 28 (cited in
note 127).
133. Interview with Jonathan I. Charney, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University (Nov. 16,
1995) ('Charney Interview").
134. Id.
135. See UNCLOS III, Art. 3.
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not signatory, the proliferation of expanded claims was rapidly
turning the new twelve-mile limit into customary international law.136
The federal government wished to keep up with this trend, but the
Reagan Administration was concerned that doing so would prompt
individual U.S. coastal states to expand their own sovereignty claims
to twelve miles. The Administration feared that this would result in
those states becoming embroiled in international affairs, the exclusive
constitutional province of the federal government, and in a renewal of
the disputes regarding ownership of the oil and gas resources between
three and twelve miles.
3 7
In response to these developments, President Reagan issued a
proclamation extending the United States' territorial sea to twelve
miles, but for international purposes only.ls8 The proclamation in-
cluded a disclaimer explicitly stating that it had no effect whatsoever
on the state of domestic law and offshore federalism.1s
9
136. Charney Interview (cited in note 133).
137. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 688 (cited in note 34).
138. Reagan Proclamation, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (cited in note 8).
139. "Nothing in this Proclamation: (a) extends or alters existing Federal or State law or
any jurisdiction, rights, legal interests, or obligations derived therefrom.. ." Id.
The extension of the territorial sea by proclamation rather than by treaty with the advice
and consent of the Senate raised questions about, the power of the Executive, acting alone, to
assert a territorial claim. This issue was addressed by the Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel ("OLC') prior to the issuance of the Proclamation. The OLC concluded that:
... the President can extend the territorial sea from three to twelve miles by proclama-
tion ... by virtue of his constitutional role as the representative of the United States in
foreign relations. The President's foreign relations authority under the Constitution
clearly permits his unilateral assertion on behalf of the United States of jurisdiction
over the territorial sea. Whether the President may individually assert sovereignty over
the territorial sea is open to some question, although on the basis of several long-settled,
historical examples of Presidents unilaterally claiming territory in this fashion, we be-
lieve that he may.
Kmiec, 1 Terr. Sea J. at 2 (cited in note 31). This article is a reprint of the original OLC opinion.
See id. at 6-7 nn.16, 18 for a summary of authorities to the effect that the President has broad
authority over the nation's conduct in foreign affairs.
Foremost among the examples of unilateral executive assertions of sovereignty cited in the
OLC memo was the original claim to a three-mile territorial sea made by President Washington
and Secretary of State Jefferson in 1793. "[I]n making the original claim to the territorial sea
[Washington and Jefferson] relied on the President's constitutional power as the representative
of the United States in foreign affairs to proclaim sovereignty, and not simply jurisdiction, over
unclaimed territory." Id. at 14. Other examples cited by the OLC included the acquisition of
the Midway Islands in 1869 and Wake Island in 1899. Both of these were acquired by discovery
and occupation. Id. at 15. The OLC concluded that "the considerations which explain why the
President's constitutional position as the representative of the United States in foreign affairs
allows him to acquire territory by discovery and occupation counsel that the same constitutional
status allows him to proclaim sovereignty over an extended territorial sea." Id. at 16. The OLC
also observed that practical considerations lend credence to this presidential authority, noting
that "[a]s our representative in foreign affairs, the President is best situated to announce to
other nations that the United States asserts sovereignty over territory previously unclaimed by
another nation." Id.
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This disclaimer has been the subject of considerable contro-
versy. Critics have called into question its effectiveness in limiting
the application of domestic law to the area between three and twelve
miles, and thus in precluding the extension of state boundaries be-
yond three miles. Some commentators insist that the disclaimer is
necessarily invalid. The proclamation asserts full sovereignty and
jurisdiction for the United States out to twelve miles from shore, then
indicates by the disclaimer that a full assertion of sovereignty is not
intended. In effect, it attempts to create a type of federal property
which is subject neither to domestic law nor to international law.
This appears wholly inconsistent, critics argue, with the usual notions
of the territorial sea and sovereignty.' 4° If the marginal sea out to
twelve miles from shore now constitutes the territorial sea of the
United States, the argument continues, then this country exercises
full plenary power over it and, presumably, it must be subject to exist-
ing domestic law, notwithstanding the proviso inserted in the procla-
mation.141
International law supports the contention that a nation's do-
mestic laws apply in its territorial sea. In defining the territorial sea,
UNCLOS III stipulates that the sovereignty of a coastal nation ex-
tends beyond its land and internal waters to the territorial sea.142 By
this definition it appears that by claiming a territorial sea "in accor-
dance with international law,"143 the proclamation asserted national
sovereignty over that area. If domestic law does not apply in the new
territorial sea, then the President would seem to have created a new
type of federal property, but with questionable authority to do so.'4
Other observers disagree with the conclusion that domestic
law must apply within the newly expanded territorial sea. They ar-
gue that when making the extended claim, President Reagan was try-
ing to avoid a battle with Congress by not purporting to extend the
reach of its laws without its consent.145 When making the original
140. John A. Saurenman, The Effects of a Twelve-Mile Territorial Sea on Coastal State
Jurisdiction: Where Do Matters Stand?, 1 Terr. Sea J. 39, 66 (1990) (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 67-68.
142. UNCLOS III, Art. 2(1).
143. Reagan Proclamation, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (cited in note 8).
144. Saurenman, 1 Terr. Sea J. at 66 (cited in note 140). But see note 139 for support of
the contention that the President does have the power to claim federal territory unilaterally.
Other commentators point out that, at least to the extent that the states' ability to protect
their legitimate interests in the marginal sea between three and twelve miles offshore had for-
merly been limited by conflict with executive foreign policy, the extension of the territorial sea
has some effect on domestic jurisdiction and authority. Christie, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 176-77 (cited
in note 48).
145. Reed Interview (cited in note 66).
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claim to a three-mile belt, Thomas Jefferson did not endeavor to dic-
tate to Congress what statutes applied in that new area, and
President Reagan wished to show the same deference to the legisla-
ture. It is Congress's province alone to decide what domestic legisla-
tion should be extended to the new federal territory, although it has
never done so. Where existing statutes define the precise geographic
limits of their application, the Executive must adhere to that defini-
tion in enforcing the statutes.146 But many more laws merely state
that they apply within the territorial sea of the U.S. without defining
its limits,14 7 leaving questions as to whether Congress intended for the
statutes' scope to expand in conjunction with the territorial sea, or
whether they were presumptively limited to three miles. In these
cases, the Executive interprets the statutes delicately, enforcing them
only out to three miles, not twelve.148
Whatever domestic effect the proclamation may have had, it
seems clear that it did not extend state sovereignty to twelve miles,
for the President does not possess the power to establish the seaward
boundaries of the individual states. That power rests with Congress,
and Congress has not extended the states' seaward boundaries.149
Nevertheless, the unintended consequence of the proclamation's dis-
claimer was to produce a very unsettled legal regime in the marginal
seas between three and twelve miles.150
146. The Clean Water Act, for example, defines the "territorial sea" in which it applies as
extending three miles from shore. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (1994 ed.). However, the provisions re-
lating to oil and hazardous substance liability apply out to twelve miles because they prohibit
discharges of oil or hazardous substances in the navigable waters of the United States,
specifically including the contiguous zone. Id. § 1321(b)(3). The contiguous zone is defined in §
1321(a)(9) as the zone established by Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone (part of the First United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
I), the latest UNCLOS in effect at the time the Clean Water Act was passed). That article de-
fines the contiguous zone as extending from the then three-mile limit of the territorial sea out to
twelve miles. UNCLOS III redefined the contiguous zone as extending from the limit of the new
twelve-mile territorial sea out to twenty-four miles from shore. UNCLOS III, Art. 33.
147. For example, the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (1994 ed.), makes it
unlawful to take endangered species "within the United States or the territorial sea of the
United States." Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
148. Reed Interview (cited in note 66).
149. Briscoe, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 228 (cited in note 29). See also California, 332 U.S. at 27
(explaining that Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution "vests in Congress 'Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to
the United States.. :.' We have said that the constitutional power of Congress in this respect is
without limitation. Thus neither the courts nor the executive agencies could proceed contrary to
an Act of Congress in this congressional area of national power" (internal citation omitted)).
150. Richard J. McLaughlin, The Impact of the Extension of the U.S. Territorial Sea on
Foreign Flag Vessels, 2 Terr. Sea J. 91, 92 (1992).
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IV. THE SEAWARD EXTENT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Because the federal judicial districts are defined by reference
to the state counties they contain, the seaward limit of those districts
cannot be ascertained without first determining the general limit of
state sovereignty in the marginal seas. As the history of offshore fed-
eralism indicates, the location of that limit is an unsettled and highly
elusive issue. Nevertheless, four distinct possibilities stand out from
this history: a zero-mile offshore limit; a universal three-mile offshore
limit; a three-mile limit except for Texas and Florida's Gulf Coast,
each having nine miles; and a twelve-mile limit. Valid arguments can
be made for and against each of these possibilities. This Part ex-
amines those arguments and concludes that, under the current state
of the law, the universal three-mile limit is the most tenable.
However, in deference to the uncertainty which plagues this issue,
this Part applies all four possibilities to the hypothetical set out at the
beginning of this Note, in order to illustrate the venue consequences
of each if it were adopted.
A. A Zero-Mile Limit
1. The Case For and Against a Zero-Mile Limit
California, Texas, Louisiana, and Maine provide strong
support for the argument that state sovereignty does not extend even
to the three-mile marginal sea. The holdings in those cases establish
that the coastal states were not sovereign in the three-mile belt
seaward of their coastlines prior to the formation of the Union. It
follows that they are not sovereign in that belt today. However, this
position has not been seriously argued, and it generally receives little
credence.
The legislative history of the SLA clearly indicates that the
Act's purpose was to restore to the coastal states the sovereignty they
thought they had before the Tidelands Controversy. Unfortunately,
the language of the SLA does not specify that it grants sovereignty in
the three-mile territorial sea to the states. It speaks only in terms of
title to the seabed and the resources thereunder, "recogniz[ing],
confirm[ing], establish[ing], and vest[ing] in and assign[ing]" that title
and those rights to the states or to the persons entitled to them under
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existing leases with the states at the time of the Act.',' Further, this
language suggests that Congress could not have made any "persons"
sovereign over the three-mile belt. Nevertheless, the general
assumption is to the contrary. This is in large part a reaction to the
language Congress used for its grant.1 2 The grant's language is so
comprehensive, so much more than what would be required for an
ordinary grant of title or jurisdiction, that it is commonly equated to a
grant of sovereignty despite the lack of the explicit use of that term.
In addition, when addressing conflicts between states or be-
tween states and the federal government, the Supreme Court gener-
ally analogizes to principles of international law.1 3 The international
law cases slip back and forth between the terms sovereignty and title
when addressing territorial disputes.154 Thus, it is generally assumed
that the language of the SLA, with its reference to title, was sufficient
to extend state sovereignty to three miles, particularly in light of the
clear congressional intent to do so. 155 The statute's potentially trou-
bling reference to "persons" can be explained by interpreting the pro-
vision to mean that in granting sovereignty over the three-mile belt to
the states, Congress intended for any leases and grants made by
states prior to the Act to remain valid despite the intercession of
California.15
6
The one hundred fifty-year-old assumption of state sovereignty
over the three-mile marginal sea that predominated before the
California decision further buttresses the present presumption of
such sovereignty. Although a strict reading of the SLA alone does not
151. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1988 ed.).
152. The statute grants to the states "title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable
waters within the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural resources within such
lands and waters, and... the right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use
the said lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable State law." Id.
153. See, for example, Georgia v. South Carolina, 497 U.S. 376 (1990) (adopting the special
master's recommendation for the location of the seaward boundary between Georgia and South
Carolina and noting that the special master felt constrained by international law); Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Company, 206 U.S. 230 (1977) (allowing Georgia to maintain a public
nuisance action against a corporation by virtue of Georgia's sovereignty, despite the lack of an
injury sufficient for a private party to sustain such an action).
154. Charney Interview (cited in note 133).
155. Title II [of the SLA] merely fixes as the law of the land that which, throughout our
history prior to the Supreme Court decision in the California case in 1947, was generally
believed and accepted to be the law of the land; namely, that the respective States are
the sovereign owners of the land beneath navigable waters within their boundaries and
of the natural resources within such lands and waters.
Confiring and Establishing the Titles of the States to Land Beneath Navigable Waters Within
State Boundaries and to the Natural Resources Within Such Lands and Waters, H.R. Rep. No.
695, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (July 12, 1951) (footnote omittied).
156. See notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
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support this assumption, such an approach discounts the substantial
value of history and simply is not in accord with modern scholarly
thought on the issue.
2. A Zero-Mile Boundary and the Hypothetical
In the USA Oil hypothetical, USA Oil operates three oil plat-
forms-at two, six, and ten miles off the coast of Texas, respec-
tively-and allegedly causes unpermitted releases from each. Federal
prosecutors must determine the proper venue in which to file the
charges arising from each platform. If any platform is located within
the state's boundaries, and therefore within a federal judicial district,
Rule 18 applies and venue for the charges relating to each platform
will lie in the district in which that platform is located. For charges
relating to any platform located beyond the state's boundaries,
Section 3238 stipulates that venue lies in the district in which the
offenders were arrested or first brought, or, since these defendants
were not arrested or first brought into a district, the district of their
last known address. If state sovereignty ended at the low water line,
resolution of the question of venue in the hypothetical situation would
be fairly simple. State boundaries, and therefore county and judicial
district boundaries as well, would coincide with the low water line.
Because each of the rigs is located offshore, each of the alleged dis-
charges would have occurred outside of any state or judicial district,
and Section 3238 would control the entire case.
Because none of the offenders was arrested or first brought
into the Southern District of Texas, the government could not prove
venue in that district. Rather, it would have to proceed under the
second alternative of Section 3238, which fixes venue in the district of
the last known address of one or more of the joint offenders. Venue
would therefore lie in the Southern District of California, assuming
that the company itself or any of its executive officers were named as
defendants. Venue would also lie in the District of Delaware if the
company itself were named as a defendant, and in the District of
Alaska if the former rig foreman was named as a defendant.157
Trial of this case in California, Delaware, or Alaska as opposed
to Texas would impose a significant burden on the federal govern-
157. Under the joint offenders provision of § 3238, venue for all of the defendants would be
proper in any of the districts in which it was proper for any one of the defendants. 18 U.S.C. §
3238. For example, venue for trial of the former rig foreman would also lie in the Southern
District of California provided that USA ORl itself or any of the corporate executive officers was
also a defendant. Of course, questions of personal jurisdiction still would have to be addressed.
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ment. The cost of transporting all relevant documents, witnesses, and
evidence across the country would be substantial, perhaps even un-
feasible. It would be a great burden on the Assistant U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of Texas and the other government
personnel who participated in the investigation and prepared the in-
dictments to transfer their operations for the duration of the trial.
Besides the obvious logistical difficulties and the lack of familiarity
with the particular judges, the distance would impair the prosecutor's
ability to attend to his or her other cases. Of course the case could be
reassigned to the U.S. Attorney's Office based in the district of venue,
but that would result in a prosecution handled by attorneys other
than those most familiar with the facts, history, and circumstances of
the alleged violations. Removing the prosecution from the "natural"
district (the Southern District of Texas) to satisfy the arbitrary
requirements of Section 3238158 thus imposes significant costs on the
criminal enforcement process. A zero-mile limit to coastal state
sovereignty would result in far more frequent impositions of these
costs which society ultimately bears.
B. A Universal Three-Mile Limit
1. The Case For and Against a Universal Three-Mile Limit
The strongest argument for a universal three-mile seaward
limit to state sovereignty is momentum. Following its adoption by the
United States as a stopgap measure in 1793, the three-mile limit
gradually gained international acceptance. 159 The passage of time
obscured this limit's arbitrariness, tentativeness, and supposed
temporariness. 160 The assumption of a universal three-mile limit
persisted for one hundred fifty years until the Tidelands Controversy.
Even after California decision, Congress so staunchly believed in the
three-mile state limit that it battled the executive for six years to
restore it through the SLA.161
Commentators commonly interpret the SLA as having
definitively established the boundaries of state sovereignty as three
158. In Layton, the Ninth Circuit observed that the original purpose of § 3238 was to create
an "arbitrary rule of venue" for offenses not committed in any judicial district and therefore not
addressed by the constitutional criminal venue provisions of Article III and the Sixth
Amendment. 855 F.2d at 1411.
159. See Part III.B.
160. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 681-82 (cited in note 34).
161. See notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
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miles from the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and a maximum of nine
miles off the Gulf coasts of Florida and Texas. 162 But basic principles
of property law suggest that while the SLA was effective in granting
Florida and Texas an interest in the resources of the Gulf between
three and nine miles, it could not have granted them sovereignty
within that six-mile belt. The conveyance in the SLA was by
quitclaim.163 By virtue of the Truman Proclamation,164 the United
States had jurisdiction and control over the resources of the
continental shelf. But the Truman Proclamation did not in any way
assert national sovereignty over the continental shelf. National
sovereignty only extended to three miles at the time the SLA was
passed. This was the limit originally asserted by Thomas Jefferson in
1793 and the maximum claim permitted under international law prior
to UNCLOS III in 1983. Thus, all that could have been transferred by
the SLA quitclaim in 1953 was jurisdiction and control of the
resources beyond three miles-not sovereignty. Though national
sovereignty was extended to twelve miles by the Reagan Proclamation
in 1988, such an expansion does not retroactively amend a quitclaim
made thirty-five years prior. 65 Since the Reagan proclamation,
162. See notes 116-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the boundaries established
by the SLA.
163. The congressional quitclaim grant states:
The United States releases and relinquishes unto said States and persons aforesaid, ex-
cept as otherwise reserved herein, all right, title, and interest of the United States, if
any it has, in and to all said lands, improvements, and natural resources.
43 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (emphasis added). In contrast to a general warranty deed, a quitclaim deed
transfers only those interests which the grantor has in the property at the time of the
conveyance. The grantor transfers whatever rights, title, and interest the grantor may have in
the property, "if any," to the grantee. The use of a quitclaim deed can be regarded as notice to
the grantee that there may be outstanding equities against or impediments to the grantor's title
and can thus deprive a grantee of bona fide purchaser status. Richard R. Powell and Patrick J.
Rohan, 6A Powell on Real Property 897[1][b] (Matthew Bender, 1995). Thus, while Florida
and Texas received the complete interest of the United States in the submerged lands and
resources of the nine-mile marginal sea, the quitclaim device employed by the SLA was
insufficient to confer sovereignty upon them because the United States was not sovereign in
that area.
164. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Sept. 28, 1945).
165. There is a doctrine known as estoppel by deed, or the doctrine of after-acquired prop-
erty, which holds that if a grantor conveys land in which he has no rights with warranty of title,
and afterwards acquires good title, that title instantly passes to the vendee, and the grantor is
estopped from denying that he had no right in the property at the time of the sale. Powell and
Rohan, 6A Powell on Real Property at 90112] (cited in note 163). The doctrine prevents a gran-
tor from making a conveyance in which he or she assures the grantee that title is being trans-
ferred, and later asserting paramount title to gain unjust enrichment. Id. Estoppel by deed
does not depend on proof of fraudulent intent on the part of the grantor. Id. This may be used
in support of the contention that the federal government's 1988 assertion of sovereignty over a
twelve-mile territorial sea resulted in an instantaneous conferral of sovereignty out to nine
miles to Florida and Texas. However, estoppel by deed requires that the original conveyance
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Congress has not acted to grant sovereignty over the three- to nine-
mile area to Florida and Texas, so they cannot claim sovereignty
beyond three miles. 166 Therefore, historically as well as legally, a
universal three-mile limit to U.S. coastal state sovereignty is the most
sound and defensible position.
2. A Universal Three-Mile Boundary and the Hypothetical
If the limit of state sovereignty lies at three miles for all
coastal states, management of the hypothetical case against USA Oil
becomes problematic. The platform lying two miles offshore would be
located within the State of Texas and therefore within the Southern
District of Texas. There would be no problem in bringing a prosecu-
tion of the alleged violations related to that platform in that district.
However, if the government wished to proceed with a prosecution of
the alleged violations committed on the six- and ten-mile platforms,
Section 3238 would still require that it do so in either the Southern
District of California, the District of Delaware, or the District of
Alaska. Unfortunately, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do
not authorize supplemental, or "pendent," venue in criminal prosecu-
tions, and in the absence of a pendent venue rule, the USA Oil prose-
cution would have to be split.167
included a warranty of title. Id. Quitclaim deeds by definition contain no warranties of title,
and as such are categorically excepted from the doctrine of estoppel by deed. Id.
166. It would be invalid to argue that Florida and Texas are sovereign to nine miles in the
Gulf of Mexico by virtue of the very historical claims which prompted Congress to grant them
ownership of the submerged lands out to that distance in the SLA. The converse application of
the equal footing doctrine applied by the Court in Texas, 339 U.S. at 715-20, dictates that the
two states forfeited all such unique and independent claims of sovereignty upon their admission
to the Union and precludes such an argument.
167. F.R.Cr.P. 8(a) provides for joinder of offenses in an indictment where the offenses are
of the same or similar character, are based on the same act or transaction, or are connected or
constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. However, it does not authorize supplemental, or
"pendent," venue for the multiple offenses. In order for charges to be joined, there must be an
independent basis of venue under Rule 18, Section 3237, or Section 3238 for each charge in the
district in which the case is prosecuted. This is a result of the article III and sixth amendment
requirements that all crimes be tried in the state and district in which they were committed.
In situations such as the one presented by the USA Oil hypothetical, a rule authorizing pen-
dent venue would make sense while still respecting the constitutional policies underlying the
article III and sixth amendment guarantees. The principle underlying these constitutional
guarantees was fairness to the defendant. Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215, 224 (1956)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). The goal was to protect a defendant from being subjected to the hard-
ships of standing trial away from home, where, at that time, most crimes were committed and
where the Framers believed people normally would receive the fairest trial. Id. The Supreme
Court has expressed a continuing concern that, where possible, choices of venue between appro-
priate districts be made with consideration for the policies of fairness expressed by the Framers.
See, for example, United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944) (indicating that whenever
possible, even when not required, laws should be interpreted so as to lay venue in the vicinage
of the crime in accordance with the underlying spirit of the Constitution); Cores, 356 U.S. at 407
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Prosecution of the charges for which venue would lie only in
California, Delaware, or Alaska would engender the same costs and
burdens discussed in relation to a zero-mile limit. In light of these
costs and the opportunity to prosecute the charges stemming from the
two-mile platform in the Southern District of Texas, the government
may elect not to prosecute the alleged violations arising from the six-
and ten-mile platforms at all. This decision would impose certain
costs of its own, including allowing known crimes to go unpunished.
It would, however, avoid the more tangible costs associated with un-
dertaking two prosecutions, one of which would occur in a remote
district.
C. A Combined Three- and Nine-Mile Limit
1. The Case For and Against a Combined Three- and Nine-Mile Limit
The argument in favor of a nine-mile limit to sovereignty for
the states of Florida and Texas derives from the Supreme Court cases
that originally approved those states' nine-mile boundaries under the
SLA. In Louisiana II, the Executive Branch argued against the exten-
sion of any of the Gulf states' boundaries to nine miles on the grounds
that the extension of a state boundary beyond the national boundary
would be an international embarrassment with the potential to em-
(stating that when the language of an act permits, it should be construed so as to respect the
considerations of fairness and hardship arising out of prosecution of the accused in a remote
place).
A rule allowing pendent venue in criminal cases would not offend these notions of fairness;
it would arguably further the policy. If an indictment is filed in a district in which venue is
proper for one or more of the included charges, the defendant must face trial on those charges in
that district. It hardly offends the basic notion of fairness to have the defendant stand trial in
that district on additional charges arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts. While it
may impose a slight additional burden, it would be no greater inconvenience than defending a
separate prosecution in a different district on related charges.
Pendent venue could be authorized easily by amending Rule 18. The following is one
suggestion for revision of the rule:
(b) In all cases where venue is proper under this rule for prosecution of a particular
offense in a district, venue shall also be proper in that district for prosecution of all other
offenses that are based on the same act or transaction, or for two or more acts or trans-
actions that are related or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.
This provision would enable the government to prosecute an entire criminal case in a single dis-
trict and avoid the inefficiencies associated with multiple prosecutions in multiple districts. The
fact that no rule authorizing pendent venue has been promulgated is undoubtedly due to the
infrequency with which situations such as the hypothetical discussed in this Note have arisen.
But given the increased emphasis the Department of Justice is placing on offshore environ-
mental crimes, a limited criminal joinder rule would be a wise and valuable addition to the
Federal Rules.
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broil the states in international affairs.168 The Court responded that
while the President has authority over the extent of the nation's terri-
torial claims versus the international community, the power to admit
new states and establish state boundaries rests with Congress.
Congressional establishment of state boundaries beyond federal
boundaries may have international consequences, but it also has con-
sequences for relations between the federal government and the
states. It was with respect to these domestic consequences that
Congress approved the potential nine-mile boundaries of Florida and
Texas in the SLA.169
Though it may appear that the SLA granted Florida and Texas
nine miles of sovereignty in the Gulf of Mexico, the Louisiana II Court
avoided that issue. It did not decide whether congressional approval
of these state boundaries beyond federal boundaries constituted an
overriding determination that those states, and therefore the nation,
claimed a nine-mile boundary as against foreign nations. Thus, the
decision cannot be cited for the proposition that the nation was sover-
eign out to nine miles in the Gulf and could have conferred such sov-
ereignty to those states. The Louisiana II Court simply held that,
with respect to conflicting claims by the federal government, Florida
and Texas had rights in and title to the lands beneath navigable wa-
ters out to nine miles and the resources within those lands and wa-
ters.
As explained in the previous Part, the SLA is commonly
understood as establishing the definitive seaward boundaries of the
U.S. coastal states. The language used in the Act does not explicitly
qualify its provision which stipulates that "[t]he seaward boundary of
each original coastal State is approved and confirmed as a line three
geographical miles distant from its coast line or... beyond three
geographical miles [to three marine leagues] if it was so provided by
its constitution or laws prior to or at the time such State became a
member of the Union."70 This broad language supports the argument
that while three miles is the limit of state sovereignty in the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans, Florida and Texas are sovereign to nine miles in
the Gulf of Mexico. The legislative history of the SLA lends further
support to this position. It clearly indicates that the purpose of the
Act was to restore to the coastal states what they thought they had
168. Kmiec, 1 Terr. Sea J. at 7 (cited in note 31).
169. Id. at 8.
170. 43 U.S.C. § 1312.
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before California and its progeny.171 Texas and Florida considered
themselves sovereign to nine miles in the Gulf of Mexico and were
able to prove the source of those claims, if not their validity, in the
Louisiana 11 and Florida cases. Therefore, the SLA can reasonably be
interpreted as granting Florida and Texas nine miles of sovereignty in
the Gulf of Mexico.
Unfortunately, as explained earlier, the SLA's use of a quit-
claim to convey title to the submerged lands and resources of the
marginal sea, combined with a converse application of the equal foot-
ing doctrine, effectively undermines this argument. The United
States was not sovereign beyond three miles upon passage of the SLA,
and Congress has not taken remedial action since the nation asserted
its sovereignty out to twelve miles. Thus, the SLA could not have con-
ferred upon these two states the sovereignty which the Supreme
Court repeatedly determined the states surrendered to the national
government, if they ever possessed it at all, upon the original ratifica-
tion of the Constitution. 172
2. A Nine-Mile Boundary for Texas and the Hypothetical
If Texas's sovereignty extends nine miles into the Gulf of
Mexico, the result in the USA Oil hypothetical is very similar to the
situation engendered by a three-mile boundary. The two-mile and the
six-mile platforms would lie within the State of Texas. The alleged
violations arising out of both of those platforms could therefore be
prosecuted in the Southern District of Texas. Venue for prosecution
of the charges related to the ten-mile platform would still lie only in
the Districts of Delaware, Alaska, and the Southern District of
California. Though the resulting costs of prosecution in a remote dis-
trict would be the same as those under a universal three-mile bound-
ary, the government may be more inclined not to prosecute these
charges because of its ability to prosecute the greater part of the en-
tire case in the Southern District of Texas. This decision would de-
pend upon a balancing of factors, such as the social costs of not prose-
cuting some of the charges, the amount and sufficiency of the evidence
pertaining to the alleged violations at each of the platforms, and the
perceived strength of the case relating to each platform. Ultimately,
the U.S. Attorney's Office has discretion to make the decision.
171. See H.R. Rep. No. 695 at 4-5 (cited in note 155).
172. See Special Masters'Reports at 591 (cited in note 125) (concluding that federal rights
superseded states' claims to seabed interests seaward of the SLA grant).
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However, in general terms, a nine-mile boundary for the state of
Texas would reduce both the economic and social costs of law en-
forcement associated with a three-mile boundary.
D. A Twelve-Mile Limit
1. The Case For and Against a Twelve-Mile Limit
Little historical or legal precedent exists to support the propo-
sition that the seaward boundaries of state sovereignty lie at twelve
miles. One argument in favor of this position is that the Reagan
Proclamation extended state boundaries to twelve miles when it ex-
tended the nation's territorial sea to twelve miles, but this argument
is fundamentally flawed. The power to establish state boundaries
reposes in Congress, not the president, and Congress itself has not
acted to extend state boundaries since the Reagan Proclamation.173
The terms of the SLA do not extend state sovereignty to twelve miles
in the wake of the Reagan Proclamation. The SLA refers to state
boundaries in terms of a fixed distance and does not tie their defini-
tion to the territorial sea, much less to future extensions of the terri-
torial sea. The Proclamation thus could not have extended state
boundaries via the SLA even if President Reagan expressly intended
that result.74
In addition, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
("OCSLA"), 65 passed as a companion to the SLA, provides clear evi-
dence of Congress's intent that state boundaries are not to extend be-
yond three (or nine) miles. OCSLA reserved all rights in and title to
the submerged lands of the continental shelf beyond three miles
(beyond nine miles off the west coast of Florida and Texas) and the
resources therein for the federal government. Section 1333 of OCSLA
specifies that federal law applies to this area of the continental shelf,
and that, when not inconsistent with existing federal law, the laws of
each adjacent state also apply in the area adjacent to each particular
state. But the statute makes it clear that this provision for the appli-
cation of state law to the federally owned portion of the continental
shelf is never to be interpreted as a basis for any state to claim any
interest in or jurisdiction over the area of the continental shelf beyond
173. Briscoe, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 228 (cited in note 29). See note 149 and accompanying text.
174. Briscoe, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 229 (cited in note 29).
175. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq.
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three miles.176 Had Congress intended the states to be sovereign over
some portion of the outer continental shelf while merely retaining
mineral rights for the federal government in the three- to twelve-mile
zone, it clearly would not have taken such care to preclude any claim
of any type of interest by the states in that zone.
In spite of the arguments that the limit of state sovereignty
does not currently extend to twelve miles, there are good reasons why,
in the wake of the Reagan Proclamation, state sovereignty should be
extended to twelve miles. First, the twelve-mile territorial sea, cou-
pled with a three-mile limit of state sovereignty, results in a band of
generic federal territory nine miles wide with an area of 180,000
square miles, about the size of Texas. 177 Every other federal territory
that is not part of any state has its own territorial government except
for Midway, Johnston, and Wake Islands, which are administered by
the Defense Department, and the uninhabited guano islands of
Navasso, Swan, Howland, Baker, and Jarvis, which are easily distin-
guishable from the territorial sea by virtue of their extreme isola-
tion. 78 The territorial sea, on the other hand, has no established gov-
ernment and could not be comprehensively managed by any one
agency, unless it was annexed to the coastal states. 79
From an historical perspective, it should be remembered that
the three-mile zone was an impromptu and provisional creation of
Thomas Jefferson in response to a situation requiring immediate ac-
tion. Jefferson did not intend it as a final, definitive limit for state
sovereignty. In fact, he and President Washington felt strongly that
state sovereignty should eventually extend beyond three miles. But
due chiefly to its adoption by the British, the three-mile limit gradu-
ally developed into the international default rule.80
The extension of national sovereignty to twelve miles presents
an opportunity to explore a new approach. The forty-year-old scheme
176. Id. § 1333(a)(3).
177. David M. Forman, M. Casey Jarman, and Jon M. Van Dyke, Filling in a Jurisdictional
Voi& The New U.S. Territorial Sea, 2 Terr. Sea J. 1, 51 (1992).
178. Id.
179. Briscoe, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 293 (cited in note 29). Proposals abound in the wake of the
Reagan Proclamation for the creation of joint federal-state management regimes to administer
the newly expanded territorial sea. See, for example, Richard K. Littleton, Equity, Efficiency,
and a 12-Mile Coastal State Boundary, 2 Terr. Sea J. 331, 336 (1992); Kenneth A. Swenson, A
Stitch in Time: The Continental Shelf, Environmental Ethics, and Federalism, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev.
851, 879-91 (1987). However, these proposals only address the management of the resources in
the three-to-twelve mile zone and do not consider the issue of state boundaries per se, or the
limits of the federal judicial districts.
180. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 745 (cited in note 34). See Part III.B for a discussion of the
genesis of the three-mile coastal state boundary.
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developed during the Tidelands Controversy has not kept pace with
society's technological ability to exploit the sea.'81 With the extension
of national sovereignty to twelve miles, the only rationale justifying a
three-mile limit to state sovereignty has been extinguished. 18
Recently, there have been calls for an extension of state sover-
eignty to twelve miles. In 1991 the Western Legislative Conference of
the Council of State Governments passed a resolution calling on
Congress to extend both the seaward boundaries and the resource
jurisdiction of the states to twelve miles.183 This would increase the
area of the states without any loss of uniformity in coastal policy.184
Such an extension need not cause tremendous upheaval. Most
observers calling for such an extension in the wake of the Reagan
Proclamation recommend a universal twelve-mile limit with a shared
state-federal cooperative management regime, or some similar form of
partnership.85 The primary obstacle to such a change would be the
issue of ownership of the rights to and revenues from the resources of
the continental shelf between three (or nine) and twelve miles.1ss The
federal government would almost certainly be unwilling to relinquish
these revenues. 187 Further, the inland states would have no incentive
to grant these revenues to the coastal states, thereby forfeiting their
own share. 88
Various options exist for overcoming this obstacle. One recent
proposal calls for the designation of the three- to twelve-mile zone as
a "Zone of Shared Revenues," from which all states would share in the
revenues on a per capita basis.189 Another option would be to grant
the coastal states sovereignty over the territory and designate the
continental shelf as public lands, treating it the same as the public
181. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 739 (cited in note 34).
182. There is, as one commentator puts it, "no good reason to continue binding states to a
three-mile [limit of sovereignty].... It is through the force of inertia alone that the states'
three-mile limit persists." Id. at 689.
183. See id. at 740.
184. Vital control of navigation and commerce is unified under national authority due to
federal constitutional supremacy in the country's navigable waters. Littleton, 2 Terr. Sea J. at
336 (cited in note 179).
185. See, for example, Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 739-45 (cited in note 34); Swenson, 60 S.
Cal. L. Rev. at 879-91 (cited in note 179); Territorial Sea Extention, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Oceanography and Great Lakes of the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (March 21, 1989) (statement of Professor Robert
Knecht, University of Delaware).
186. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 744 (cited in note 34).
187. Littleton, 2 Terr. Sea J. at 355 (cited in note 179).
188. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 744 (cited in note 34).




lands that make up such a substantial part of the western states.
This would settle the question of venue by establishing a definite limit
to the states, counties, and therefore the judicial districts, without
requiring wholesale revision of the current management regime.
If the coastal states were to accept a plan that does not entitle
them to revenues from their new territory, however, they would have
to justify to their citizens why they have accepted increased public
obligations in the zone without demanding corresponding benefits. 19
Furthermore, tension already exists between the executive branch,
which favors development and exploitation of the continental shelf,
and the states, which generally do not. A situation forcing the states
to sit idly by while the federal government granted leases for the
development of their continental shelf would only exacerbate this
tension.19'
Regardless of the management regime selected, a twelve-mile
limit to state sovereignty would have one distinct advantage over the
zero-mile, universal three-mile, and mixed three- and nine-mile lim-
its. By eliminating the stateless zone of federal sovereignty, a twelve-
mile limit would create a single boundary for state title, jurisdiction,
and sovereignty. This would eliminate the confusion and uncertainty
which plagues the question of venue for crimes committed beyond
three or nine miles. Furthermore, depending on the management re-
gime selected, a twelve-mile limit offers the opportunity to streamline
management of the coastal zone by broadening the authority of the
states, the entities responsible for coastal zone management under
the Coastal Zone Management Act.'
92
2. A Twelve-Mile Boundary and the Hypothetical
The USA Oil hypothetical clearly illustrates the superiority for
venue purposes of the twelve-mile limit to coastal state sovereignty.
With a twelve-mile limit, all three of the platforms would be located
within the Southern District of Texas. Rule 18 would not only allow,
but dictate, that the government prosecute all of the charges against
USA Oil in the Southern District of Texas because it is the district in
which the alleged crimes were committed.
190. Id. at 331-32.
191. Wilder, 32 Va. J. Intl. L. at 744 (cited in note 34).
192. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (1994 ed.). The Coastal Zone Management Act provides fed-
eral grants to states for the creation of State Coastal Zone Management Plans and guarantees
that federal activities within the coastal zone will be, to the maximum extent practicable,
consistent with the enforceable provisions of the attached state's plan. Id.
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This result is a natural one, and leads to the lowest social costs
because it does not force the government to choose between allowing
provable crimes to go unprosecuted and incurring needless expenses
in prosecuting the case in a remote district unconnected with the
crime itself. Further, it places greater reliance on the constitutional
venue directives embedded in Rule 18 and less emphasis on the
arbitrary provisions of Section 3238.
V. A NEW APPROACH TO ANALYZING THE PROBLEM
As the preceding discussion of the history of offshore federal-
ism and the seaward extent of state sovereignty indicate, the current
state of the law regarding venue for offshore environmental crimes is
extremely uncertain. While this is due in large part to the arbitrari-
ness of the various claims and boundaries and the political considera-
tions which pervade this area of the law, it is fundamentally the re-
sult of the language and concepts that have been, and in current prac-
tice must be, used to analyze the problem.
The analysis required by the language of the venue statutes
involves the drawing of distinctions between preexisting concepts
such as title, jurisdiction, and sovereignty. These concepts evolved in
the context of a completely different problem, that of control of the
lands and resources of the continental shelf and the marginal seas. In
that narrow context they remain valid. The concepts of title and ju-
risdiction are essential, for example, when considering the question of
ownership of the lands and resources of the continental shelf. But
trouble arises when one attempts to use those concepts, and the limits
ascribed to them in the SLA and OCSLA, to define limits for the more
abstract concept of state sovereignty in order to determine the extent
of the federal judicial districts.
Sovereignty is an elusive concept-an artificial, rhetorical con-
struction used to convey notions of supreme authority or plenary in-
dependence of rule. It is ill-suited for resolving technical legal ques-
tions such as whether a particular crime was committed within a ju-
dicial district. When a federal crime is committed in U.S. waters, it
should not matter whether the adjacent coastal state is sovereign over
those waters, or whether the state is entitled to the mineral rights in
that area. The only concern should be for the constitutional require-
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ment that the crime be tried in the same vicinity in which it was
committed.' 9
3
Unfortunately, the current legal framework, which requires a
choice between Rule 18 and Section 3238, depends instead upon a
technical determination of whether the crime was committed within
or outside of a judicial district. This in turn requires a determination
of state boundaries. But what state boundaries? Not title, and not
resource jurisdiction-for nothing in the venue statutes makes refer-
ence to these specialized concepts. The boundaries at issue, then,
must be some transcendent, all-purpose limit of state authority. This
inevitably leads to the ethereal concept of sovereignty. In a confound-
ing trap of circular logic, this guides the venue analysis back to the
concepts of title and jurisdiction to define the limits of sover-
eignty-the very concepts determined to be inappropriate for this
purpose.
A better approach to the problem, one which avoids this confu-
sion, involves taking a step back from the letter of the law and looking
instead to the purpose of the law. The problem of offshore venue can
be addressed in this manner by answering two questions: (1) what
was Congress seeking to accomplish by the Rule 18/Section 3238
venue scheme; and (2) when the limits of that scheme are in question,
what are the limits of congressional power to impose such a scheme?
Along with Section 3237, Rule 18 and Section 3238 comprise a
comprehensive scheme for assigning venue for every criminal case.
Rule 18 sets venue for crimes committed within a single district,
Section 3237 lays venue for crimes committed in multiple districts,
and Section 3238 provides venue for crimes committed outside of any
district.194 By establishing this scheme, Congress responded to the
constitutional requirement that all crimes be tried in the vicinity in
which they were committed. In the case of Rule 18 and Section 3237
this was a simple matter, but there was no similar, natural solution
for assigning venue for crimes committed outside of any district. The
solution Congress adopted was the arbitrary rule embodied in Section
3238. This solution created a new problem of where to draw the
boundary line for the federal judicial districts, the boundary between
Rule 18 and Section 3238. As the preceding Parts of this Note
demonstrate, this question has never been addressed, largely because
it has never been asked.
193. See Part II for an explanation of the constitutional policy underlying the requirement
that all crimes be tried in the district in which they are committed.
194. See notes 18-22 and accompanying text for a full explanation of these provisions.
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The most rational means of determining where the boundaries
of the federal judicial districts lie is to ask where the limits of con-
gressional power to act in this area lie. The boundary between Rule
18 and Section 3238 should be set as far seaward as congressional
power permits. A fundamental assumption of this approach is that it
is preferable to establish venue under Rule 18, a direct codification of
the Sixth Amendment, than to rely on the arbitrary gap-filling provi-
sions of Section 3238.
Congress has the power to establish judicial districts anywhere
within the United States. This power derives from the Constitution,
which allows Congress to establish "such inferior courts" as it deems
necessary.195 On this authority, Congress has passed judiciary acts
establishing the judicial districts and the district court system. The
Constitution contains no explicit limits on the power of Congress to
establish judicial districts. This power is implicitly limited, however,
to the area within the nation's territorial boundaries.
As a matter of international law, the boundaries of the nation,
in contrast to those of the individual states, have been clearly estab-
lished by treaty. The twelve-mile territorial sea claimed by the
United States in the Reagan Proclamation and universally adopted as
the international standard in UNCLOS III currently represents the
undisputed boundary of the nation.196 Therefore, it represents the
maximum possible seaward limit of the federal judicial districts.
Setting the federal district boundaries at this limit would effectively
restrict the application of Section 3238 to those crimes actually
committed on the high seas or overseas, rather than to crimes com-
mitted a mere 3.1 miles offshore-beyond the ostensible limits of the
states but clearly within the exclusive territory of the nation.197
195. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 1.
196. UNCLOS III, Art. 3.
197. The extension or clarification of the district boundaries could be accomplished in a
variety of ways. One of the simplest would be to amend Rule 18 as follows:
For purposes of this Rule, and all other rules and statutes relating to the place of prose-
cution and trial, the judicial districts shall extend beyond the land territory of the sev-
eral states to the limit of the territorial sea claimed by the United States at the time of
the commission of the offense.
Alternatively, similar language could be inserted as a separate statute in the U.S. Code imme-
diately prior to or following the district definitions located at 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131:
Notwithstanding the actual boundaries of the counties comprising the various judicial
districts, every judicial district appurtenant to the coast line of the United States shall
extend beyond the coast line to the limit of the territorial sea of the United States.
Each of these approaches would eliminate the present uncertainty as to the seaward extent of
the judicial districts. As an additional benefit, by defining the district boundaries by reference
to the territorial sea, they would eliminate the need to redefine the district boundaries in the
event of any future extensions of the territorial sea.
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This approach would not result in any legitimate unfairness to
defendants. Taking the hypothetical case of USA Oil, it would be dif-
ficult for the defendants to argue that while it is proper to prosecute
the charges related to the two-mile platform in the Southern District
of Texas, it would be unfair to prosecute the charges arising out of the
six- and ten-mile platforms in the same district. Even if the defen-
dants had not operated a platform two miles offshore, such that they
were not otherwise required to stand trial in the Southern District of
Texas, they would not have a compelling argument. It would hardly
offend constitutional notions of fairness to require them to stand trial
in the Southern District of Texas. The alleged crimes took place
within twelve miles of that state's coast, within the boundaries of the
United States, and venue would have been proper in the Southern
District of Texas had the crimes been committed within three miles of
the coast.
The approach advocated in this Part would be accompanied by
all of the benefits of a twelve-mile limit to state sovereignty, with
none of the political difficulties that an actual expansion of state
boundaries to that distance would entail. It respects the intent of
Congress to create a seamless criminal venue scheme while employing
a functional analysis of that scheme, rather than a literal reading to
identify the proper limits within which its component statutes should
operate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The constitutional requirement of criminal venue is a vital
aspect of every prosecution. The statutory scheme created for crimi-
nal venue seeks to respect the constitutional concern for trial of a
crime in the vicinity of its commission. But there is an emerging class
of criminal prosecutions, environmental crimes committed within the
U.S. territorial sea, that exposes a fundamental weakness in the tra-
ditional venue scheme. When applied to domestic offshore environ-
mental crimes, the statutory scheme depends on a definition of state
boundaries that bears little relation to the underlying goals and pur-
pose of the scheme itself. While the statutes do not specifically refer-
ence this definition, it is the only one currently available to address
the issue. This definition, the limit of U.S. coastal state sovereignty
in the marginal seas, is itself an abstract notion. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that it lacks any valid historical foundation. In
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the wake of those decisions, this orphaned concept has thrown federal
venue analysis into great uncertainty.
Based on the history and development of offshore federalism,
there are at least four possible limits to state sovereignty. Currently,
the most reasonable conclusion is that the limit of state sovereignty in
the marginal seas lies at three miles from shore around the entire
nation. But since President Reagan proclaimed a twelve-mile limit
for national sovereignty, frequent calls have sounded for an expansion
of state sovereignty to twelve miles, and such an extension has much
to recommend it. However, a twelve-mile limit to state sovereignty
faces significant political obstacles before it can be realized, particu-
larly the distribution of revenues from the exploitation of the re-
sources between three and twelve miles. That is not the case with an
extension of the judicial districts alone to twelve miles.
No legitimate reason exists to tie the limits of the federal judi-
cial districts to the boundaries of state sovereignty. Such a connection
is currently necessary only because the judicial districts were origi-
nally defined as coterminous with those boundaries. A fresh, objec-
tive look at the purpose of the criminal venue scheme reveals a better
approach. By defining the limits of the federal judicial districts as the
limits of the federal territorial sea, a much-needed symmetry can be
achieved between the geographical limits of the federal government's
power to define illegal conduct and its power to enforce those defini-
tions.
M. Benjamin Cowan*
* The Author would like to thank Mr. Michael W. Reed of the United States Department
of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division, General Litigation Section, and
Professor Jonathan I. Charney of Vanderbilt Law School, for their many helpful comments, sug-
gestions, and insights. The Author would also like to thank Mr. T. Neal McAliley of the United
States Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division, Environmental
Crimes Section, who was instrumental in the development of this topic and who provided in-
valuable information, advice, and support throughout the preparation of this Note.
868 [Vol. 49:825
